The Arab nations will continue operating within a framework of catch-up development for the foreseeable future. This is a persistent, imperative factor shaping the essence of economic and social policies in the region. It applies equally to capital-surplus and capital-deficient states.
The Arab world is enduring a period of the most severe events, essentially deadly revolutions, fraught not only with economic losses. A powerful blow has been struck to humanitarian values and the psychology of people caught in the epicenter of tragedies unfolding across vast regional spaces.
Naturally, over their centuries-long existence, Arabs have repeatedly experienced various shocks that left marks on their further fate. But nothing similar to the current explosion of bitterness has occurred in the modern history of Arab states. The region has been plunged into a series of conflicts that have escalated into large-scale civil wars, the height of which is now seen in Iraq and Syria.
Five years of armed struggle have led to unexpected shifts. Stable regimes have collapsed, their former leaders have paid the price, new governments and movements have formed, and new semblances of elites have emerged. An unprecedented Islamic quasi-state has arisen, introducing criminal practices of governance and economy.
The emergence of such a strong player, receiving overt and covert aid from seemingly respectable states—from leading democracies to monarchies—has revived the darkest forces in the Arab world and far beyond. The terrorist international that arose on this basis has overturned previous notions of Islam, distorted the deep understanding of jihad, and created an atmosphere of widespread violence and destruction in its bases.
The region has entered a state of intense fermentation, its volatility has increased to the extreme, where interests and claims of global and regional powers converge, leaving Arab governments too little room for maneuver. Much of the Middle East forms a complex pattern, interwoven with military actions and diplomatic activity of giants, plus a spectrum of local players—from tribal militia sheikhs to low-level field commanders. This seriously complicates the situation, sometimes putting it on the brink of unpredictability, while the multiplicity of participants fragments the picture of events, creating secondary and tertiary layers, as the protracted resolution hinders outlining starting points for a peace process.
The Unique Nature of the Arab East
The Arab East is a multifaceted and highly distinctive cultural-civilizational phenomenon, perhaps unknowable to the end. This is especially felt in an era of massive perturbations that have led literally to tectonic shifts in the regional organism. Nevertheless, it is evident that in the post-war period, the Arab world will inevitably face the problem of choosing models and paths of development.
Its mode of action will be dictated, besides the pragmatism inherent in Arabs, also by the consequences of civil wars. This will affect not only states directly impacted by them but also those that remained somewhat aside. After all, even the pronounced individuality of specific countries against the region’s inherent multivariance does not exclude systemic qualities that allow seeing it in broad strokes in the coming time.
Even after the war with Islamists, the factors that exerted predominant influence on the region will persist, though undergoing certain changes depending on the position of individual countries in the local coordinate system.
Geopolitical Importance and Global Interests
First and foremost, the Arab East, occupying significant territory in Asia and Africa, should retain its geopolitical significance and continue to be the object of close attention from major world powers with direct economic, political, military, and other interests there. Within globalization processes, its influence may grow over time. As it accumulates prerequisites for economic growth and creates internal conditions for safe development, large niches on its territory may turn into hubs for international investment, trade, and recreational activity. This primarily concerns the Persian Gulf monarchies, which persistently implement the idea of a unified transport-energy center with access to all countries. At a great distance from them and on a smaller scale, Egypt also strives toward the hub idea. This is a serious task for the future, but for the rest, it is eventual, considering the consequences of Arab revolutions and the general disarray gripping the Middle East and North Africa.
Overall, the Arab East, neighboring the Western civilization that has achieved colossal progress and acting on Arab platforms with various goals—from destructive to constructive—and even being actively interested in advanced technologies, will strive to remain on its positions in civilizational terms. Vast traditionalist enclaves in mass consciousness, stereotypical worldview, and an active conservative trend serve as a protective barrier between it and the outside world, guaranteeing the preservation of identity. But this obstacle no longer seems absolute, and the political environment will clearly undergo evolution under the influence of liberal Western programs for improving political and economic climate, promoting democracy and free trade.
In this sense, the situation in Saudi Arabia, considered a solid stronghold of the Arab conservative idea, may not be so unexpected. Paradoxically, it could become the center of new events in the region, with prerequisites gradually accumulating in its society.
The Arab East, neighboring the Western civilization that has achieved colossal progress and even being actively interested in advanced technologies, will strive to remain on its positions in civilizational terms. But the political environment will clearly undergo evolution under the influence of liberal Western programs for improving political and economic climate.
Economic Modernization and Reforms
The Arab East indeed faces a serious process of modernizing productive forces and enhancing macroeconomic performance through structural reforms in the economic sphere. The content of reform processes will be determined by the political preferences of ruling regimes. Over the coming decades or even shorter terms, additional incentives may arise for reducing the state’s role in the economy, developing the middle class, emerging atypical for Arab capital types of activity—startup companies, venture projects, innovative systems, and the like. All this is a sore point for the region. But the topic is already being voiced, and in Arabian monarchies—Qatar, Dubai—they have directly started showing interest in new business forms. In other countries, movement is still minimal, awaiting better times.
Parallelly, the Arab world will gradually fill attempts at democratizing its states with new content, expand the sphere of civil activity, diversify decision-making processes. However, it is appropriate to assume that this will be democratization “with an Arab face,” that is, as it is seen and understood by the people.
In connection with this, ruling regimes, now widely qualified as authoritarian, may acquire a new look or form but without losing internal content. In the Arab East, authoritarianism of power has deep roots, and under confessionalism and centrifugal tendencies, it will remain in demand. In the Arab environment, I believe, the need for strong power, an authoritative leader capable of maintaining constitutional order and organizing movement toward national goals, will persist.
Ethnic and Religious Conflicts
Ethno-confessional and interreligious contradictions will remain a stumbling block not only in states affected by terror. Persecuted communities and minorities will long retain memory of the inflicted evil and violence and will not weaken the struggle for their rights, turning it into the leitmotif of post-war settlement. The greatest activity, it seems, should be expected on the Kurdish track. After the expulsion of Christians and other communities, Kurdish issues will sharpen even more, potentially provoking a chain of acute crises. In any case, Kurds will not abandon the idea of their own state, or at least autonomy, which they earned through armed struggle against ISIS. Syrian Kurds will be especially persistent, seeing the example of Iraqi Kurdistan and realizing their role in countering Islamists.
There is no doubt that the Arab East will emerge from trials physically and morally suppressed. And in society, anxiety and fears of recurrences of organized violence will persist for a long time. Especially since the idea of a caliphate is unlikely to be buried. Particularly if considering that remnants of jihadists and future neophytes will be displaced to other territories and will inevitably sprout. Consequently, terrorism in the form of guerrilla warfare will persist, continuing the fermentation of minds in societies afflicted by the flawed idea, and not only there. As a result, there is a high probability of preserving criminalization, and in conditions of ruin—archaization of social processes, that is, return to clan patronage practices. In Syria, where the process is particularly intense, intra-family ties have kicked into full gear. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of internal refugees are flocking to relatives in safe areas, especially the coast, where an islet of stability remains.
Echoes of these events may spill beyond the conflict zone and resonate in terrorism-supporting Arabian monarchies. In them, internal discontent has long been accumulating surreptitiously, antagonisms within elites are ripening, as well as rivalry between them. Quite explainable convulsions in their direction may be organically supplemented by long-smoldering discontent caused by the deep fracture of the Arab world along the “prosperity-poverty” line.
All this may one day erupt into an explosion that, even if not crushing the Persian Gulf states, will shake their foundations and force them to change under a new development paradigm. Major oil exporters are unlikely to exhaust energy resources in the next 80-120 years. And this is the guarantee of their comfortable future, even if the era of alternative energy sources arrives. But even then, petrochemicals will remain in their hands, revenues from which, like from oil before, will be a source of appeasing popular indignation in crisis situations.
Still, specific directions of ruling regimes’ evolution will remain unclear. Radicalization of some and liberalization of others are possible. However, the phenomenon of American democracy will remain unacceptable for the Arab East, which develops according to its traditions, principles, and civilizational foundations. With the unchanged American course on exporting democracy, this moment may noticeably heat up the situation in the Arab East and be used for managing its elites.
The Arab world is a world of two poles: prosperity and relative sufficiency bordering on poverty. The increasing gap will further hinder integration processes as the basis of development and provoke refusal
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For more on related topics in BRICS context, [Link to related BRICS article]. See insights on Middle East conflicts via IMF economic data. Explore Arab economic modernization through OECD regional reports.
